Introduction
The Delhi High Court has upheld the acquittal of an accused in a rape case, holding that DNA evidence establishing biological paternity and sexual intercourse does not, by itself, establish that the intercourse was non-consensual.
In KXXXXX v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr., Justice Madhu Jain dismissed an appeal filed by the prosecutrix against the judgment of acquittal passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi.
The High Court found that the Trial Court had considered the prosecution evidence cumulatively and had identified material inconsistencies concerning the alleged administration of an intoxicating substance, the prosecutrix’s state of consciousness, the circumstances surrounding the pregnancy, the alleged threats and other aspects of the prosecution narrative.
The Court held that the Trial Court’s view was a reasonably possible view on the evidence. Consequently, there was no compelling ground for appellate interference with the acquittal.
Case Details
| Particular | Details |
|---|---|
| Case Name | KXXXXX v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. |
| Court | High Court of Delhi at New Delhi |
| Case Number | CRL.A. 320/2026 |
| CNR No. | DLHC010132792026 |
| Decision Date | 3 September 2026 |
| Judge | Justice Madhu Jain |
| Appeal | Appeal against acquittal |
| Trial Court Case | SC No. 151/2022 |
| FIR | FIR No. 138/2021, PS Dwarka North |
| Charges | Sections 328, 376(2)(n), 377, 506 and 509 IPC |
| Result | Appeal dismissed; acquittal upheld |
The appeal was filed by the prosecutrix under Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) against the Trial Court’s judgment dated 7 October 2024 acquitting the accused of all charges.
Facts of the Case
The prosecutrix was residing with her husband and their adopted child. Her husband had suffered a serious disability following a fall from a roof in 2007 and was unable to father a biological child. The couple had adopted a child in 2014.
According to the prosecution, the accused was known to the family and used to visit their house.
It was alleged that from 2017 onwards, the accused established physical relations with the prosecutrix against her wishes by allegedly using threats and inducements.
The prosecutrix further alleged that on one occasion an intoxicating substance was administered to her, after which the accused established physical relations with her.
The allegations were stated to have continued over a period of time and included allegations of repeated sexual acts, threats and unnatural intercourse.
The prosecutrix became pregnant and gave birth to a child on 20 June 2019.
During investigation, DNA samples of the prosecutrix, accused and child were collected and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory.
The DNA examination established that the accused was the biological father of the child.
The prosecutrix subsequently disclosed the alleged incidents to her husband and family members.
An FIR was registered on 17 March 2021 under Sections 376, 377 and 506 IPC. Her statement under Section 164 CrPC was recorded on 18 March 2021.
Trial Court Acquittal
The Trial Court framed charges under:
- Section 328 IPC — causing hurt by means of poison, etc.;
- Section 376(2)(n) IPC — repeated rape;
- Section 377 IPC;
- Section 506 IPC — criminal intimidation; and
- Section 509 IPC — word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman.
The accused admitted that he had physical relations with the prosecutrix but claimed that the relationship was consensual and known to her husband.
After considering the evidence, the Trial Court acquitted him on all charges.
Among other things, the Trial Court found inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecutrix and her husband and considered the delay in registration of the FIR and the possibility of a consensual relationship.
Appeal Before the Delhi High Court
The prosecutrix challenged the acquittal.
Her counsel argued that the Trial Court had failed to properly appreciate the testimony of the prosecutrix and the DNA evidence.
Reliance was placed on Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that the credible and trustworthy testimony of a prosecutrix can, by itself, form the basis of conviction.
It was further argued that the DNA report conclusively established that the accused was the biological father of the child and therefore constituted strong corroborative evidence.
The appellant also argued that the accused’s claim of a consensual relationship was unsupported by defence evidence and that the Trial Court had given excessive importance to contradictions and delay in reporting.
Main Issue Before the High Court
The central question before the Delhi High Court was:
Whether the Trial Court’s acquittal suffered from perversity, patent illegality or misappreciation of material evidence so as to justify interference in an appeal against acquittal?
Delhi High Court on Appeals Against Acquittal
The Court reiterated the settled principle that an appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal merely because another view of the evidence is possible.
Interference is justified where the Trial Court’s findings are:
- perverse;
- manifestly illegal;
- based on misreading or omission of material evidence; or
- where the conclusion of guilt is the only reasonable conclusion possible from the evidence.
The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, which reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions are possible, the appellate court should not disturb the acquittal.
DNA Evidence: What Did the Court Hold?
One of the most important observations in the judgment concerns the evidentiary value of DNA testing.
The High Court acknowledged that the DNA report established that the accused was the biological father of the child.
Therefore, the DNA evidence was significant in proving that sexual intercourse had occurred between the parties.
However, the Court drew a critical distinction:
Proof of intercourse is not automatically proof of absence of consent.
The DNA report did not establish the circumstances in which the sexual relationship occurred and did not determine whether the relationship was consensual or non-consensual.
This distinction was central to the Court’s decision.
The prosecution still had to establish the ingredients of the offence charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 114A Evidence Act and Prosecutrix’s Testimony
The appellant relied upon Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act.
The High Court acknowledged that the statutory presumption under Section 114A becomes relevant where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved and the woman states in her evidence that she did not consent.
However, the Court clarified that the statutory presumption does not make the testimony of the prosecutrix immune from judicial scrutiny.
The Court stated that the foundational facts must still be established and that the Court is entitled to examine the evidence and circumstances relied upon by the defence.
Thus, the existence of a statutory presumption does not eliminate the judicial duty to evaluate the evidence.
Material Contradictions in the Prosecutrix’s Evidence
The High Court found that the Trial Court had not rejected the prosecutrix’s testimony merely because she was the prosecutrix.
Instead, the Trial Court compared her testimony with her earlier statements, the evidence of her husband and other material on record.
The High Court considered several discrepancies to be material.
1. Alleged Administration of Intoxicant
The prosecutrix stated in her Section 164 CrPC statement that the accused administered an intoxicant before establishing sexual relations.
However, the High Court noted that the allegation did not appear consistently in her initial complaint and substantive trial testimony.
There were also variations concerning how the alleged intoxicant was introduced into the milk.
2. State of Consciousness
Another significant discrepancy concerned the prosecutrix’s condition during the alleged first incident.
In the complaint, she stated that after consuming the milk she became drowsy and could see what was happening but could not move her hands and legs.
During her deposition, however, she initially stated that she remembered nothing after being taken to another room until she woke up the following day.
The High Court considered this discrepancy significant because the prosecution relied upon the alleged intoxicant and resulting condition to establish absence of consent during the first incident.
3. Pregnancy and Paternity
The Court also considered inconsistencies concerning when the prosecutrix informed her husband about the pregnancy and whether he questioned the paternity of the child.
The versions in her Section 164 statement and trial deposition differed.
The husband also did not support the version concerning his alleged conduct before the child’s birth.
The Trial Court was therefore entitled to consider these discrepancies while assessing the overall credibility of the prosecution case.
4. Alleged 100-Number Police Call
The evidence concerning the circumstances in which a 100-number police call was made was also inconsistent between the prosecutrix and her husband.
The Trial Court considered this contradiction along with the other discrepancies.
5. Alleged Nude Photographs and Videos
The prosecutrix alleged that the accused had taken nude photographs and videos and threatened to circulate them.
However, the alleged photographs and videos were not produced.
The accused’s mobile phone was subjected to forensic examination, but the alleged photographs, videos or chats were not recovered.
The High Court held that the Trial Court was entitled to consider the absence of such electronic corroboration when assessing the allegations under Sections 506 and 509 IPC.
Delay in FIR: Was It Sufficient for Acquittal?
The High Court made an important clarification.
It recognised that the conduct of a prosecutrix in a sexual offence cannot be assessed through stereotypical assumptions about how a victim should behave.
Similarly, delay in reporting a sexual offence, by itself, cannot be treated as sufficient to reject the prosecution case.
However, the Court held that the conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances are not completely irrelevant when assessing competing versions and determining whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the Trial Court did not rely upon delay alone. It assessed the evidence cumulatively.
Can the Prosecutrix’s Sole Testimony Lead to Conviction?
Yes, as a matter of law, the testimony of a prosecutrix can form the sole basis of conviction in an appropriate case.
But the High Court emphasised that the testimony must be reliable, trustworthy and capable of inspiring confidence.
The principle does not mean that courts must ignore material contradictions and inconsistencies.
The High Court referred to State (GNCT of Delhi) v. Vipin @ Lalla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 78, concerning the need for careful judicial scrutiny where material contradictions appear in the testimony of a prosecutrix.
Therefore:
Sole testimony can be sufficient — but it must be credible.
Section 377 IPC Charge
The High Court also upheld the Trial Court’s reasoning concerning the Section 377 IPC charge.
The allegations concerning oral and anal sexual acts were not stated with the same specificity in the earlier versions of the prosecution case.
There was also no medical or other corroboration concerning the alleged oral sexual acts.
The Trial Court was therefore entitled to consider these improvements while deciding whether the charge had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 328 IPC Charge
The Court also upheld the acquittal under Section 328 IPC.
For this offence, the prosecution had to establish not merely that the prosecutrix became drowsy, but that the accused administered or caused to be administered a poison, stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome substance with the required intention or knowledge.
The alleged incident had occurred several years before the FIR. No substance was recovered or scientifically examined, while the testimony concerning the incident contained inconsistencies.
The High Court held that the Trial Court’s conclusion that the charge was not proved could not be termed perverse.
Absence of Defence Evidence Does Not Prove Guilt
The appellant argued that the accused had not led defence evidence.
The High Court rejected the suggestion that this justified interference with the acquittal.
The prosecution must prove its case in accordance with law.
The absence of defence evidence cannot relieve the prosecution of its burden or convert weaknesses in the prosecution evidence into proof of guilt.
The defence version may be considered to the extent permitted by law, but the ultimate question remains whether the prosecution has proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Evidence Must Be Appreciated Cumulatively
A particularly important aspect of the judgment is the Court’s approach to contradictions.
The Court did not treat each discrepancy separately.
Instead, it held that the discrepancies must be assessed cumulatively.
The Court distinguished between minor discrepancies that do not affect the core prosecution case and material inconsistencies concerning circumstances that form an integral part of the prosecution narrative.
In the present case, the inconsistencies concerned the alleged administration of intoxicants, the prosecutrix’s condition during the first incident, the circumstances surrounding pregnancy and paternity, and the conduct attributed to her husband.
Serious Allegations Cannot Replace Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt
The High Court acknowledged the gravity of the allegations.
However, it emphasised that the seriousness of an accusation cannot substitute the standard of proof required in a criminal trial.
The prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Where the evidence permits a reasonable view consistent with innocence, the accused is entitled to the benefit of that view.
Supreme Court Precedent on Appeals Against Acquittal
The High Court relied upon the principles reiterated by the Supreme Court in Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa.
The relevant principles include:
- An acquittal carries a strengthened presumption of innocence.
- An appellate court should not interfere merely because another view is possible.
- The Trial Court’s view must be shown to be perverse or clearly unreasonable before interference is justified.
- Material evidence must have been ignored or misread for appellate intervention to become warranted.
- There must be compelling and substantial reasons for overturning an acquittal.
- If the Trial Court’s view is a possible view based on the evidence, the acquittal should ordinarily be maintained.
Ratio Decidendi
The central principle emerging from the judgment is:
DNA evidence establishing biological paternity and sexual intercourse does not, by itself, establish absence of consent. Where the Trial Court has reasonably evaluated the testimony of the prosecutrix, DNA evidence, surrounding circumstances and other material and arrived at a possible view supporting acquittal, an appellate court should not interfere merely because another view is possible.
Key Takeaways
- DNA evidence can establish sexual intercourse and biological paternity, but does not by itself establish non-consent.
- A prosecutrix’s testimony can independently sustain conviction when it is reliable and inspires confidence.
- The sole-testimony principle does not prevent courts from scrutinising material contradictions.
- Section 114A of the Evidence Act creates a statutory presumption in appropriate circumstances but does not make evidence immune from judicial scrutiny.
- Delay in reporting a sexual offence cannot, by itself, destroy the prosecution case.
- Surrounding circumstances may nevertheless be considered while assessing competing versions.
- Material contradictions must be assessed cumulatively rather than mechanically.
- Absence of defence evidence does not relieve the prosecution of its burden.
- The seriousness of allegations cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.
- An appellate court should not overturn an acquittal merely because another reasonable view is possible.
- A Trial Court’s acquittal can be interfered with where its view is perverse, manifestly illegal, clearly unreasonable or based on misreading of material evidence.
- Where the Trial Court’s conclusion is reasonably possible on the evidence, the strengthened presumption of innocence operates in favour of the accused.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can DNA evidence alone prove rape?
No. In this judgment, the Delhi High Court held that DNA evidence established that the accused was the biological father of the child and therefore established sexual intercourse, but it did not by itself establish whether the intercourse was consensual or non-consensual.
Can the testimony of a prosecutrix alone lead to conviction?
Yes. The testimony of a prosecutrix can form the sole basis of conviction if it is reliable, trustworthy and inspires confidence. However, courts are entitled to scrutinise it for material contradictions and inconsistencies.
Does delay in filing an FIR automatically weaken a rape case?
No. Delay by itself is not sufficient to reject a sexual-offence prosecution. However, the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties may be considered along with the entire evidence when determining credibility.
What is the significance of Section 114A of the Evidence Act?
Section 114A provides a statutory presumption concerning absence of consent in specified circumstances after sexual intercourse is proved and the woman states that she did not consent. The High Court held that the presumption does not prevent judicial scrutiny of the foundational facts and evidence.
Can an appellate court overturn an acquittal simply because it disagrees with the Trial Court?
No. Where the Trial Court’s view is a reasonably possible view on the evidence, an appellate court should not interfere merely because another view is possible.
Why did the Delhi High Court uphold the acquittal?
The Court found that the Trial Court had considered the material evidence and had identified several material inconsistencies. Its conclusion was reasonably possible on the evidence and was not shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unreasonable.
Final Judgment
The Delhi High Court found no compelling ground to interfere with the Trial Court’s judgment dated 7 October 2024.
The Court held that the Trial Court’s findings were based on an appreciation of the evidence and could not be described as perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unreasonable.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused under Sections 376(2)(n), 377, 328, 506 and 509 IPC was upheld.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court’s decision in KXXXXX v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. reinforces two important principles of criminal law.
First, scientific evidence must be interpreted according to what it actually proves. DNA evidence can conclusively establish biological paternity and sexual intercourse, but it does not automatically establish the absence of consent.
Second, an appeal against acquittal faces a significant threshold. If the Trial Court has properly considered the evidence and its conclusion is a reasonably possible one, the appellate court will not substitute its own view merely because another interpretation of the evidence is available.
