Introduction
The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, has granted interim protection to the petitioners in Krishna Kant Pandey and Another v. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Home, Lucknow and Others, concerning an FIR registered in Pratapgarh under Section 356(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act, 2000, as amended in 2008.
The Court found that a prima facie case for interference was made out and directed that the impugned FIR remain stayed until further orders. It also directed that no action be taken against the petitioners by the authorities pursuant to the FIR.
The case is particularly significant because the Court examined whether the alleged creation and use of an email ID in another person’s name could, on the allegations contained in the FIR, amount to an offence of identity theft under Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act.
The Court’s preliminary reasoning focused closely on the statutory language used in Section 66-C and observed that the provision expressly refers to an “electronic signature”, “password” or “unique identification feature”, but does not expressly use the words “e-mail ID.”
Case Details
| Particular | Details |
|---|---|
| Case Name | Krishna Kant Pandey and Another v. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Home, Lucknow and Others |
| Court | High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench |
| Case Number | Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 8317 of 2026 |
| Date of Order | September 1, 2026 |
| Bench | Justice Abdul Moin and Justice Pramod Kumar Srivastava |
| Police Station | Aaspur Devsara, District Pratapgarh |
| FIR/Case Crime No. | 0193 of 2026 |
| Relevant Provisions | Section 356(2), BNS, 2023 and Section 66-C, Information Technology Act, 2008 |
| Nature of Order | Interim stay of the impugned FIR |
The order records that the matter was heard by Justice Abdul Moin and Justice Pramod Kumar Srivastava.
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Background and Facts of the Case
The petitioners challenged an FIR dated July 23, 2026, registered as FIR/Case Crime No. 0193 of 2026 at Police Station Aaspur Devsara, District Pratapgarh. The FIR invoked Section 356(2) of the BNS and Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act, 2008.
According to the allegations discussed in the order, the petitioners were alleged to have created an email ID in the name of a third person and used it to send what were described as fake complaints to various persons, including the Lok Ayukta.
The petitioners disputed the applicability of the provisions invoked in the FIR.
With respect to Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act, the petitioners argued that the provision concerns identity theft involving the fraudulent or dishonest use of another person’s electronic signature, password or unique identification feature.
The central question was therefore whether merely creating and using an email ID in another person’s name could fall within the statutory language of Section 66-C.
Legal Issues Before the Court
The order raises two principal legal questions:
- Whether the allegations in the FIR disclosed an offence under Section 356(2) of the BNS concerning defamation.
- Whether the alleged creation and use of an email ID in another person’s name amounted to an offence under Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act, 2008.
The Court considered the parties’ competing submissions before deciding whether interim protection should be granted.
Arguments of the Petitioners
Challenge under Section 356(2) BNS
The petitioners argued that Section 356(2) of the BNS pertains to defamation.
They relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, reported as (2016) 7 SCC 221. According to the submission recorded in the order, the Supreme Court had held that in cases of criminal defamation, an FIR cannot be filed and proceedings must instead be initiated by way of a complaint by the person aggrieved.
Challenge under Section 66-C of the IT Act
The petitioners further argued that Section 66-C specifically addresses fraudulent or dishonest use of:
- an electronic signature;
- a password; or
- another person’s unique identification feature.
Their submission was that creating an email ID does not necessarily constitute use of an electronic signature, password or unique identification feature within the meaning of the provision.
Arguments of the Respondent
The counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 and the State took a different position.
The respondent argued that the petitioners had knowingly created an email ID in the name of another individual and used that email ID to send fake messages and complaints to different persons, including the Lok Ayukta.
According to the respondent’s argument, such conduct amounted to the use of the unique identification feature of a third person, bringing the alleged conduct within the scope of Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act.
Court’s Analysis and Reasoning
What does Section 66-C actually cover?
The most important part of the order concerns the statutory language of Section 66-C.
The Court examined the words used by Parliament in the provision. It noted that Section 66-C refers to “electronic signature”, “password” or “unique identification feature.”
Significantly, according to the Court’s prima facie assessment, the legislature had not used the words “e-mail ID” in the provision.
This distinction formed the foundation of the Court’s preliminary reasoning.
The respondent’s argument was that an email ID created in the name of another individual could be treated as that person’s unique identification feature. However, the Court found this argument, at the prima facie stage, to be fallacious and misconceived.
The Court’s reasoning was that where the legislature has specifically identified the categories covered by Section 66-C, courts must pay attention to the actual statutory language rather than automatically treating every form of digital identity as falling within the provision.
Why the wording matters
The order illustrates an important principle of statutory interpretation: criminal liability must be connected to the language of the penal provision invoked.
The Court did not simply accept the proposition that because an email address identifies or represents an individual, it automatically becomes a “unique identification feature” for purposes of Section 66-C.
Instead, the Court focused on what Parliament had actually written in the statutory provision.
The order therefore demonstrates the importance of examining the precise ingredients of an alleged offence before allowing criminal proceedings to continue.
The Court’s Treatment of the Defamation Provision
The petitioners also challenged the invocation of Section 356(2) of the BNS on the basis that it concerns criminal defamation.
The petitioners relied on Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221, as recorded in the order. Their submission was that criminal defamation proceedings are required to follow the procedure applicable to a complaint by the aggrieved person rather than being initiated through an FIR.
The order records these submissions, but its operative interim protection ultimately follows the Court’s conclusion that a prima facie case for interference was made out.
The available order does not contain a final adjudication conclusively deciding every issue concerning the validity of the FIR. It is therefore important not to read the interim order as a final declaration of law on all the questions raised.
Judgment and Final Decision
The Allahabad High Court concluded that, prima facie, a case for interference was made out.
Consequently, until further orders:
- the FIR dated July 23, 2026 was stayed;
- the FIR concerned Case Crime No. 0193 of 2026;
- the FIR invoked Section 356(2) of the BNS and Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act; and
- the authorities were directed to take no action against the petitioners pursuant to the impugned FIR.
The Court also granted time to the respondents to file their counter affidavit, with two weeks thereafter available to the petitioners for filing a rejoinder.
The order was passed on September 1, 2026.
Ratio Decidendi: What Legal Principle Emerges?
Because this is an interim order and the Court expressly used the expression “prima facie”, the ruling should be understood cautiously.
The key principle emerging from the order is that criminal proceedings under Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act must be examined against the specific statutory ingredients of the provision.
On the allegations before it, the Court was not persuaded, at the interim stage, that simply creating an email ID in another person’s name necessarily constituted the use of an electronic signature, password or unique identification feature contemplated by Section 66-C.
The Court particularly relied upon the fact that the legislature had expressly mentioned those categories but had not expressly mentioned an email ID.
This should not, however, be described as a final determination that an email ID can never constitute a unique identification feature. The order only records the Court’s prima facie assessment in the circumstances before it.
Important Legal Provisions
Section 356(2), Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
The petitioners contended that Section 356(2) concerns defamation. The provision was one of the sections cited in the impugned FIR.
Its relevance to the proceedings arose from the petitioners’ argument that the procedure for criminal defamation could not properly be initiated through an FIR in the circumstances alleged.
Section 66-C, Information Technology Act, 2000
Section 66-C was central to the dispute.
As described in the order, it concerns fraudulent or dishonest use of another person’s:
- electronic signature;
- password; or
- unique identification feature.
The petitioners argued that an email ID did not fall within those categories.
The Court’s prima facie analysis accepted the force of this argument, emphasizing the exact terminology used by the legislature.
Important Precedent
| Case | Legal Principle / Issue | How It Was Used |
|---|---|---|
| Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221 | The petitioners relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision concerning criminal defamation and the manner in which such proceedings are initiated. | The case was cited by the petitioners in challenging the registration of the FIR under the defamation provision. |
The present order specifically records reliance on this Supreme Court judgment.
What Does This Judgment Mean?
For litigants
The order highlights the importance of examining whether the factual allegations in an FIR actually satisfy the ingredients of the penal provisions invoked against an accused.
An allegation involving misuse of someone’s identity in a digital environment does not, by itself, resolve the question of which specific offence has been committed. The statutory requirements remain important.
For lawyers
The case demonstrates the usefulness of a text-based statutory challenge at the stage of seeking judicial intervention.
The petitioners’ challenge to Section 66-C focused not merely on disputing the allegations but on whether those allegations, even if accepted at face value, satisfied the language of the statutory provision.
For law students
The order provides a useful example of:
- statutory interpretation;
- interpretation of penal provisions;
- the importance of legislative wording;
- the distinction between an interim prima facie finding and a final judgment; and
- judicial scrutiny of criminal proceedings.
For digital-technology users
The case also illustrates a broader legal issue arising from digital identities: the fact that an online identifier may represent a person does not automatically answer whether it falls within a particular statutory category.
The precise language of the applicable law remains critical.
Key Takeaways
- The Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, considered a challenge to an FIR registered in Pratapgarh.
- The FIR invoked Section 356(2) of the BNS and Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act.
- The allegations included creation of an email ID in another person’s name and sending complaints through it.
- The petitioners disputed the applicability of Section 66-C.
- The Court examined the specific words used in Section 66-C.
- The Court noted that the provision refers to an electronic signature, password or unique identification feature, but does not expressly mention an email ID.
- The Court found the respondent’s contrary argument prima facie fallacious and misconceived.
- A prima facie case for interference was found.
- The impugned FIR was stayed until further orders.
- The authorities were directed not to take action against the petitioners pursuant to the FIR.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Krishna Kant Pandey v. State of U.P.?
It is a 2026 criminal writ proceeding before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, challenging an FIR registered under Section 356(2) of the BNS and Section 66-C of the Information Technology Act.
What did the Allahabad High Court decide?
The Court found that a prima facie case for interference was made out and stayed the impugned FIR until further orders. It also directed that no action be taken against the petitioners pursuant to the FIR.
What was the main issue under Section 66-C?
The issue was whether the alleged creation and use of an email ID in another person’s name could amount to fraudulent or dishonest use of an electronic signature, password or unique identification feature under Section 66-C.
Did the Court hold that an email ID can never be a unique identification feature?
No. The order contains a prima facie assessment in the case before the Court. It should not be read as a categorical final ruling that an email ID can never constitute a unique identification feature.
Why was Section 66-C important?
Section 66-C was important because the FIR alleged conduct involving an email ID created in another person’s name. The Court examined whether those allegations corresponded with the specific categories identified in the statutory provision.
Which Supreme Court case was relied upon by the petitioners?
The petitioners relied on Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221, in relation to their challenge concerning criminal defamation.
Was the FIR quashed?
The order available for this article records that the FIR was stayed until further orders. It does not record a final quashing of the FIR.
What happened to further action against the petitioners?
The Court directed that no action be taken against the petitioners by the authorities in pursuance of the impugned FIR until further orders.
When was the order passed?
The order was passed on September 1, 2026.
